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Abstract. The paper focuses on farm-level nitrogen fertilization strategies of Dutch arable
farmers for analyzing the substitution of organic fertilizers (manure) with chemical fertilizers.
The model developed investigates the impact of the major parameters aﬀecting the inferiority
of manure compared with chemical fertilizers, including the low availability and non-unifor-
mity of the nitrogen in manure, and the low level and high non-uniformity of plant-available
nitrogen supplied via manure. The sensitivity of the optimal fertilization decisions and its
associated environmental impact to product price, manure cost, and environmental tax is also
examined. The theoretical analysis is applied to a representative Dutch grower of ware
potatoes in the northern part of the Netherlands. The results suggest that in the absence of a
subsidy the representative farmer will prefer to apply nitrogen only via chemical fertilizers.
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1. Introduction
A growing international demand for animal products and a favorable EU
common agricultural policy has dramatically increased livestock produc-
tion (in particular pigs and poultry) in western European countries such as
Belgium, Denmark, France, and the Netherlands. As a result of price
support for cereals in the EU and the absence of import levies, the
importing of tapioca, soybeans, citrus pulp, and maize gluten became
attractive options for Dutch livestock producers, who exploited their
proximity to the port of Rotterdam. The positive trade balance in feed-
stuﬀs led to high pressure being put on the environment through an excess
supply of minerals. This causes denitriﬁcation and leaching the soil of
* This paper was written while Feinerman was visiting with the Agricultural Economics and
Policy Group at Wageningen University.
Environmental & Resource Economics (2005) 32: 367–388  Springer 2005
DOI 10.1007/s10640-005-6647-5
phosphate and nitrogen, thereby polluting surface water and ground
water.
Mineral policies are increasingly being implemented, both at the national
level and the EU level (see Johnsen 1993; Vermersch et al. 1993; Komen
and Peerlings 1998). In the 1980s and 1990s, the Dutch government started
to introduce some policies for reducing mineral problems, involving a
limitation of the amount of minerals from manure that can be produced
(phosphate production rights) and applied to land, depending on soil type,
land use (crop) and the time period of the year. Initially, however, this
policy proved not to be completely eﬀective in reducing the production of
minerals, since total production rights were set at a level higher than actual
production. Later, the government decided to ﬁx limits for permitted
mineral losses, instead of permitted mineral application, per hectare. These
losses have to be calculated using a mineral (phosphate and nitrogen)
accounting system (MINAS). In this system, the deliveries of minerals to
the farm in the form of livestock, feed, manure, and fertilizer, in addition to
the removal of minerals from the farm in the form of products and manure
are recorded. The net diﬀerence is the mineral loss, which, above a certain
threshold, is subject to a levy. The MINAS system has been operational
since 1998. Although it was originally intended for intensive livestock
farming only, since the ﬁrst of January 2002 it is being applied for arable
farming also.
Although MINAS works rather well, the Dutch government recently
took additional measures in the form of manure outlet contracts, mainly
under pressure from the EU Nitrates Directive. A manure-producing farm
should discharge its manure surplus, based on a mineral application norm,
by contracting a party who is willing and allowed to use the manure as
fertilizer. While the manure-producing parties are mainly intensive pig and
poultry farms (in the south), the manure-receiving parties are generally
arable farms and extensive dairy farms that use manure as a substitute for
chemical fertilizer (in the north). However, arable farmers, who absorb the
bulk of the manure surplus, are rather reluctant to use manure as a sub-
stitute for chemical fertilizer. Speciﬁcally, the degree of acceptance of
manure (by arable farmers) is commonly deﬁned as the share of manure
actually applied to a speciﬁc crop planted in a speciﬁc ﬁeld from the
theoretical amount of applied manure which maximizes crop yield (e.g.,
Staalduinen et al. 2002). This degree is dependent on the source of manure
(poultry, cows, pigs), its quality (e.g., percentage of dry matter, nitrogen
and phosphate contents and more), environmentally oriented legislation
and manure price. Empirical studies show that the degree of acceptance of
manure on farms where the manure is produced is close to 100 percent.
However, on arable farms, Luesink et al. (2004) report values within the
range of 53% to 92%.
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The main reasons for their reluctance relate to the lack of homogeneity of
manure, the technical limitations to applying manure uniformly and without
damaging top soil, and the unidentiﬁed mineral contents. Moreover, the
relatively high mineral losses from manure due to leaching make it unat-
tractive from the MINAS perspective. While there seems to be equilibrium in
the market for manure at the moment, this equilibrium is rather fragile and
very much dependent on the acceptability rate of manure by arable farmers
(see Staalduinen et al. 2002). This is illustrated by the fact that manure
producers sometimes pay to discharge manure, which implies a negative price
for arable farmers for obtaining minerals from manure. Since it is likely that
environmental regulations will become stricter under pressure from the EU
Nitrates Directive, the acceptability of manure by arable farmers forms a
crucial role in future mineral policy and development of intensive livestock
farming.1 After all, the only way to avoid a further reduction in the pro-
duction level of animal farming is to distribute more manure to arable farms
(and extensive dairy farms) as a substitute for chemical fertilizer.
There is some scientiﬁc literature focused on the speciﬁc Dutch case:
Komen and Peerlings (1998) on national economic eﬀects of reducing the
mineral surplus in the Netherlands using an output restriction; Oude Lansink
and Peerlings (1997) on the eﬀects of an N-surplus tax in Dutch arable
farming; Fontein et al. (1994) on levies to reduce the nitrogen surplus at Dutch
pig farms. Another branch of literature focuses on optimal mineral applica-
tion strategies (e.g. Feinerman and Voet 1995; Feinerman and Falkovitz 1997;
Bontems and Thomas 2000) and the regulation of livestock waste (Innes 2000;
Feinerman et al. 2004). However, the issues of absorbing livestock mineral
surpluses by arable farming as a substitute for chemical fertilizer has received
little attention. In this paper we focus on the fertilization strategies of Dutch
arable farmers to analyze the extent to which they are willing to substitute
organic fertilizer for chemical fertilizer. In the model developed, we take into
account the most important variables aﬀecting the farm-level strategies, i.e.
the availability and non-uniformity of nitrogen in organic fertilizer (manure),
the non-uniformity of soil nitrogen available for crop uptake, the timing of
manure application, the taxation of nitrogen leaching, and the prices of inputs
and output. In doing so, we gain insight into the decision-making process of a
representative arable farmer, and identify the most important decisive vari-
ables, which generates useful information for policy makers.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces
the conceptual framework of the model and elaborates on comparative
statics with respect to relevant parameters. Section 3 derives optimal fertil-
ization strategies at the farm level. Section 4 illustrates the analytical ﬁndings
using a numerical example, and evaluates the sensitivity of the optimal fer-
tilization strategies to various parameters. Finally, Section 5 discusses some
caveats and derives conclusions.
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2. Conceptual Framework
Consider a Dutch arable farmer who is reviewing the fertilization strategy of
a ﬁeld for a crop that is planted in spring and harvested in fall, and has to
choose between applying manure and/or chemical fertilizer (see Figure 1).
To simplify the analysis, we will focus only on nitrogen and will not take
into account any side eﬀects of manure.2 We assume an agricultural ﬁeld ofH
hectares (ha) of clay soil and a two-dimensional spatially variable function,
~NðxÞ, where x2H represents the coordinate vector of a point in the ﬁeld.
Speciﬁcally, ~NðxÞ is the initial stock of plant-available nitrogen in the root
zone below point x, after harvesting the preceding crop. We subdivide the
ﬁeld domain into a set of S sub-plots of equal area, h=H/S ha, and denote by
~Ni the value of ~NðxÞ at the ith sub-plot.3 The distribution of ~Ni over the ﬁeld
area is assumed to be known with certainty via available spatial ﬁeld tests for
nitrogen. Nitrogen is an essential nutrient for plant growth and can be
applied via both chemical fertilizers and animal manure.
Following cultivation practices commonly used in the Netherlands, we
assume that animal manure can be applied by pre-planting only either in fall
or in spring, while chemical fertilizers can be applied by pre-planting either in
spring and/or during the growing season as a side-dressing.
The timing of manure application plays a crucial role in the decision-
making process at the farm level. Application of manure in spring inﬂicts
damage to the top soil, resulting in a reduction in the crop yield, while
application in the fall does not involve any soil damage. However, on aver-
age, about 65% of nitrogen applied via manure in the fall will not be
available for crop-uptake, and a signiﬁcant part of this amount may be
leached below the root zone and pollute water resources, while the average
rate of unavailable nitrogen applied (via manure) in spring is ‘‘only’’ about
30%. Thus, we can conclude, a priori, that it is ineﬃcient to apply manure pre-
planting both in the fall and in spring. Once the farmer applies even a small
amount of manure in spring, the top soil will be damaged. Given that the
damage has already been done, a proﬁt-maximizing farmer will apply all the
manure he wants in spring (when ‘‘only’’ 30% of its nitrogen content will be
unavailable) rather than in the fall (when as much as 65% of the nitrogen will
become unavailable).4 Another reason for the ineﬃciency of two successive
Time Summer Fall Winter Summer FallSpring
Activity Harvest
previous crop
Application
manure
Application
manure
Planting +
chemical fertilizer
Harvest
Source
nitrogen
-QN % C1A 2A
Figure 1. Fertilization strategy ﬁeld crop.
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manure applications is the ﬁxed costs associated with each application. A
single application of A kg of manure to a given ﬁeld is cheaper than two
applications of 0.5 A kg each.
Let A1 and A2 be the total amounts of manure, in kg, applied to the ﬁeld in
the fall and in spring, respectively. The amount applied to each sub-plot is
therefore equal to ak=Ak/S, k=1,2. The above discussion implies that if
A2>0 then A1=0, and if A1>0 then A2=0. Obviously, a fertilization
strategy under which a proﬁt-maximizing farmer applies only chemical
fertilizers (i.e., A1=0 and A2=0) should also be examined. Typically, the
quantity of nitrogen contained at a given volume of manure is quite variable,
and the application of manure over the ﬁeld is non-uniform, implying non-
uniform, or spatially variable, distribution of nitrogen (applied via manure)
over the ﬁeld area. The degree of non-uniformity is independent of the time
of application. We account for this non-uniformity by a positive random
variable, h, the distribution of which is aﬀected by both the variability of
nitrogen contained in manure and the non-uniformity of manure application.
Speciﬁcally, we assume that the mean and variance of h are given by
EðhiÞ ¼ EðhjÞ ¼ EðhÞ  h;8i; j and VarðhiÞ ¼ VarðhjÞ  VðhÞ ¼; 8i; j; respec-
tively. The random level of nitrogen applied to the ith sub-plot is ak hi=(A
k/
S)hi, where hi is the realization of h with respect to the manure applied to this
plot.
The eﬀective plant-available nitrogen from manure in the root zone of the
ith sub-plot is given by di
k (Ak/S)hi, k=1,2, where 0<di
k<1 is the percentage
of total nitrogen supplied via the manure applied at time k that is actually
available for crop uptake during the current growing season. The value of di
k
is aﬀected by spatially variable soil properties, weather conditions (e.g.
rainfall), slow release processes, and non-uniformity of application. Conse-
quently, the farmer will not know its realized value before the manure has
been applied. We treat di
k as a random variable, with mean and variance
given by Eðdki Þ ¼ Eðdkj Þ ¼ dk; 8i; j; and Varðdki Þ ¼ Varðdkj Þ  VðdkÞ ¼;8i; j;
respectively (in the case considered here, d1  0:35 and d2  0:70). We
additionally assume that di and hi are independent random variables. From
the total amount of nitrogen applied to the ith sub-plot, (1 ) di
k)(Ak/S)hi kg
are not used by the plant.
The total level of chemical nitrogen (in kg N), applied to the ﬁeld is
denoted by C. Advanced application technologies of chemical fertilizers
allow us to assume that C is applied uniformly over the ﬁeld area. Chemical
or mineral nitrogen available for plant uptake is bC, (0<b<1), whereas the
rest, (1)b)C, is assumed to be leached below the root zone. Without loss of
generality, we assume hereafter that due to rainfall, there is no carry-over
of organic and mineral nitrogen to the next growing period and that all
unused nitrogen is leached beyond the root zone and contaminates water
resources.5
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Plant-available nitrogen in the ith sub-plot, and expected quantity of
nitrogen not used by the plant at the ﬁeld level are thus given respectively by
Nki ¼ ~Ni þ dki ðAk=SÞhi þ bC=S; k ¼ 1; 2 (1)
and
Lk ¼ ð1 bÞCþ Akð1 dkÞh; k ¼ 1; 2 (2)
The inferiority of manure relative to chemical fertilizers implies, among other
things, that
@ENki
@C
¼ b
S
>
@ENki
@Ak
¼
dkh
S
;8i; k:
The connection between the economic optimization problem and the
physical distribution of plant-available nitrogen is made via a yield response
function. Speciﬁcally, crop yield (in kg of dry matter: DM) at the ith sub-
plot is assumed to depend on Ni
k,6 and is represented by the production
function
qki ¼ fðNki Þ  /k ¼ fð ~Ni þ dki ðAk=SÞhi þ bC=SÞ  /k; k ¼ 1; 2; (3)
where /k is a parameter of yield reduction as a result of soil damage if
manure is applied in spring. Namely,
/k ¼ 1 if k ¼ 1
<1 if k ¼ 2.
n
(4)
The function f is assumed to be strictly concave and twice diﬀerentiable. We
further assume f to be monotonically increasing in Ni
k up to some threshold
level, say N, and it decreases when Ni
k exceeds this threshold. Obviously, qi
k
is a random variable depending stochastically on di
k and hi.
Total yield over the ﬁeld area is given by:
Qk ¼
XS
i¼1
qki ¼
Xs
i¼1
fð ~Ni þ dki ðAk=SÞhi þ bC=SÞ  /k; k ¼ 1; 2: (5)
The expectation of the yield function f is given by
Effð ~Niþ dki ðAk=SÞhiþ bC=SÞ /kg ¼ Edki fEhi ½fðÞ
¼ /k
Z
dki
nZ
hi
fð ~Niþ dki ðAk=SÞhiþ bC=SÞ /kÞgðhiÞdhighkðdki Þddki ;
o
(6)
where g(hi) and h
k (di
k) are the probability density functions of hi and di
k,
respectively.
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It is useful for the analysis below to identify the approximate relationships
between the expected yield and the means and the variances of the random
variables hi and di
k. These relationships can be obtained by employing a
second order Taylor expansion of f(Æ), about h and dk which yields:
Effð ~Niþdki ðAk=SÞhiþbC=SÞ /kg fð ~Niþ dkðAk=SÞhþbC=SÞ /k
þ1
2
/kf00Nk
i
ðh;dkÞ  ðA
kÞ2
S2
½ðdkÞ2VðhÞþh2VðdkÞ;
(7)
where E is the expectation operator over di
k and hi,
f00Nki ðh; d
kÞ  @
2fð ~Ni þ dkðAk=SÞhþ bC=SÞ  /k
@ðNki Þ2
; (8)
and Ni
k is deﬁned in equation (1). The assumed strict concavity of f implies
that f00
Nki
ðh; dkÞ is negative. The sign of the third derivative of f with respect to
Ni
k is dependent on the speciﬁc assumed functional form. Here we assume that
the second order Taylor expansion is a good approximation of f, which implies
that f00
Nk
i
ðh; dkÞ is a negative constant, the absolute value of which is denoted by
bk. Inspection of (7) shows that expected yield increases in the mean values of
the random variable (as long as Nki  N) and decreases in its variances.
3. Optimal Fertilization Strategies at the Farm Level
As stated in our example, the farmer will not apply pre-planting manure in
both the fall and in spring. So, in the analysis below we deﬁne k to be either 1
or 2. In principle, the optimization problem should be solved twice, ﬁrst with
k=1 and then with k=2. Comparing the level of expected proﬁts under each
of the two cases will determine the choice of the preferred application date.
For a given date of manure application (i.e., for a given k), the optimi-
zation problem of a risk-neutral farmer is to choose Ak and C to maximize
expected proﬁt. Utilizing the approximation in (3), the problem is formulated
as follows
max
fAk;Cg
EPk ¼PQ/k
Xs
i¼1

fð ~Ni þ dkðAk=SÞhþ bC=SÞ
 1
2
bk  ðA
kÞ2
S2
½ðdkÞ2VðhÞ þ h2VðdkÞ

 wAk  PCC t½ð1 bÞCþ Akð1 dkÞh;
(9)
where PQ is income net of non-nitrogen variable costs per unit of yield (e/kg
DM); w is the sum of purchase price, variable transportation costs, and
variable application costs per unit of manure (e/kg N); PC is the per unit
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price of chemical fertilizer (e/kg N); t is tax per unit of nitrogen loss, (e/kg
N). If the farmer gets paid for the manure used, then w might be negative.
The ﬁrst order conditions for optimal Ak and C are:
@EPk
@Ak
¼ PQ/k
"
ðdkh=SÞ
XS
i¼1

f 0Nk
i
ð ~Ni þ dkðAk=SÞhþ bC=SÞ
 bk  ððdkÞ2VðhÞ þ h2VðdkÞÞA
k
S2

 w
 hð1 dkÞt  0;but ¼ 0 if Ak > 0; and
(10a)
@EPk
@C
¼ PQ/kðb=SÞ
XS
i¼1
f 0Nk
i
ð ~Ni þ dkðAk=SÞhþ bC=SÞ
 PC  tð1 bÞ  0; but ¼ 0 if C > 0;
(10b)
where f0
Nki
¼ @f
@Nk
i
. In principle, it may well be that in the optimal solution, the
marginal product of Nki for some of the plots will be negative.
3.1. FERTILIZATION STRATEGIES
Let (Ak*,C*) be the optimal input levels maximizing (9). Since nitrogen is an
essential nutrient for crop growth, we ignore the possibility that both Ak* and
C* are equal to zero. Thus, the farmer is left with a choice of three fertil-
ization strategies, presented below.
Strategy 1: Mixed application of manure and chemical fertilizers: C*>0,
Ak*>0.
Utilizing the ﬁrst order conditions (10a) and (10b), the optimal input levels
(Ak*,C*) under this strategy is determined simultaneously by equations (10a)¢
and (10b)¢ below:
1
S

XS
i¼1
f 0Nk
i
ð ~Ni þ dkðAk=SÞhþ bC=SÞ ¼ A
k  bk  ððdkÞ2VðhÞ þ h2VðdkÞÞ
Sdkh
þ ½wþ
hð1 dkÞt
PQ/
kdkh
ð10aÞ0
and
1
S

XS
i¼1
f 0Nk
i
ð ~Ni þ dkðAk=SÞhþ bC=SÞ ¼ ½PC þ tð1 bÞ
b/kPQ
: ð10bÞ0
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Equations (10a)¢ and (10b)¢ enable us to solve explicitly for Ak*:
Ak ¼ Sf
dkh½PC þ tð1 bÞ  b½wþ hð1 dkÞtg
bk  ððdkÞ2VðhÞ þ h2VðdkÞÞbPQ/k
: (11)
Note that a suﬃcient condition for Ak* to be positive is:
dkh½PC þ tð1 bÞ > b½wþ hð1 dkÞt: (12)
Inspection of (11) shows that Ak* decreases in the variances V(h) and V(d),
in the crop-uptake rate of chemical fertilizer, b, in /k and in w. Counter
intuitively, Ak* also decreases in income per unit of output, PQ. This can be
explained, however, by noting that using manure involves a penalty that is
related to the fact that b > dkh, and to the uncertainty expressed by V(h)
and V(dk). Since we are dealing with a given plot, in the optimal solution an
increase in the output price will lead to a higher level of plant-available
nitrogen, Ni, (see (1)). In our model, this can be achieved by increasing the
amount of applied chemical fertilizer and/or manure. Recalling that the
expected gross revenues per land unit is given by PQ E [f(Ni
k)/k] and noting
from (7) that
@E½fðNki Þ/k
@C >
@E½fðNki Þ/k
@Ak
, implies that the higher the output price,
the higher the penalty (i.e., the reduction in expected gross revenues)
associated with the use of manure, compared to the use of chemical fer-
tilizer7. Hence, the increase in plant-available nitrogen will be obtained
through an increase in chemical fertilizer, which exceeds the reduction of
manure.
It can also be easily veriﬁed that Ak* increases with the price of chemical
fertilizer, PC. The sign of the partial derivative of A
k* with respect to the tax
level t, is equal to the sign of ðdk  bÞ, which is likely to be positive. The
impact changes in h and in dk on Ak* are generally indeterminate and are
dependent on speciﬁc parameter values.
Substituting forAk* in (10b)¢ and noting that, ceteris paribus, increase inAk*
implies a decrease in C*, allows us to conduct comparative statics with (10b)’
and to evaluate the impact of changes in various parameters on C*. It can be
easily veriﬁed that C* increases in V(h), V(dk), w, PQ, and decreases in PC. If
@Ak
@t > 0 then
@C
@t <0, but if A
k* decreases in t, the sign of @C

@t is indeterminate.
The impact on C* of changes in h; d and b is generally indeterminate.
Strategy 2: Application of chemical fertilizers only: C*>0, Ak*=0.
This strategy will be adopted by the farmer when dkh½PC þ tð1 bÞ
<b½wþ hð1 dkÞt, (see (12)). The optimal level of C* is determined by
equations (10b)¢, with Ak*=0. Namely,
XS
i¼1
f 0Nk
i
ð ~Ni þ bC=SÞ ¼ ½PC þ tð1 bÞS
b/kPQ
(13)
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Comparative statics shows that C* decreases in PC and t, and increases in
PQ,/
k and in b.
Strategy 3: Application of manure only: C*=0, Ak*>0.
This strategy will be chosen in cases when (see (10b))
PQ/
kðb=SÞ
XS
i¼1
f 0
Nki
ð ~Ni þ dkðAk=SÞhÞ<PC þ tð1 bÞ
The optimal level of Ak* is determined by equation (10a)¢ with C*=0.
Namely,
1
S

XS
i¼1
f
0
Nki
ð ~Ni þ dkðAk=SÞhÞ  A
k  bk  ððdkÞ2VðhÞ þ h2VðdkÞÞ
Sdkh
 ½wþ
hð1 dkÞtÞ
PQ/
kdkh
¼ 0
(14)
Comparative statics with the above equation show that Ak* decreases in the
variances V(h) and V(d) and in w and increases in PQ. The signs of @A
k
@ h
and
@Ak
@ dk
are both indeterminate.
3.2. THE CHOICE OF MANURE APPLICATION DATE
Recall that /k is a parameter of yield reduction as a result of soil damage if
manure is applied in spring. Namely,
/k ¼ 1 if k ¼ 1
<1 if k ¼ 2:
n
Also recall that manure will be applied only once (if at all), either in the fall
(k=1) or in spring (k=2). So, in order to choose the date of application that
is most proﬁtable for the farmer, the optimization problem in (9) should be
solved twice, once with k=1 and once with k=2. Then, the choice of timing
should be made as follows:
• If P1ðA1 > 0;C  0Þ > P2ðA2 > 0;C  0Þ ) then choose to apply
manure in the fall, at a level of A1*. In that case there will be no soil
damage (i.e., / 1=1).
• If P2ðA2 > 0;C  0Þ > P1ðA1 > 0;C  0Þ ) then choose to apply
manure in spring, at a level of A2* at a cost of some soil damage (i.e. /2
<1).
The advantage of fall application as opposed to spring application is oﬀset by
the fact that the nitrogen loss associated with the former is greater than the
one associated with the latter (i.e., d1 > d2).
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4. Numerical Analysis
The theoretical analysis is demonstrated for ware potatoes, one of the
main ﬁeld crops grown on clay soils in the northern part of the Neth-
erlands. For the estimation of the yield function we utilized an existing,
agronomically oriented, biological–physical model, QUAD-MOD, docu-
mented by Ten Berge et al. (2000). QUAD-MOD makes it possible to
simulate the response of total dry-matter yield of a speciﬁc crop to the
applied nitrogen dose, taking into account soil characteristics, weather
conditions, general agronomic practices, and nutrient management. Spe-
ciﬁcally, it quantiﬁes the response of crop yield (denoted by Y in the
document of Berge et al) to nitrogen input (denoted by A) on the basis of
the partial response of Y to nitrogen uptake (denoted by U), Y(U), and
of the partial response of U to A, U(A). Both responses are quantiﬁed
over two domains, using diﬀerent functions U(A) and Y(U) in each
domain. Domain I applies to the lower range of nitrogen availability with
a linear U(A) function. Domain II is the upper range of nitrogen avail-
ability, using a concave functional form for U(A). The transition between
the two domains in a given nitrogen response experiment occurs at the so
called ‘‘critical point’’ and is governed by the nitrogen concentration in
the crop. Also, the function Y(U) is non-linear in the upper range (Bos
2002). We used the QUAD-MOD model to simulate the response of dry
matter of ware potatoes to seasonal plant-available nitrogen in a repre-
sentative farm, assuming average weather conditions and commonly used
agricultural practices. Using the simulated data set, we estimated the
following quadratic yield function in the absence of soil damage (t values
in parentheses):
Q1 ¼ 10636:4
ð236:0Þ
þ 10:3
ð29:9Þ
N 0:0148
ð25:3Þ
N2; ðR2 ¼ 0:94Þ
where yield, Q1, is measured in kg dry matter (DM) per ha, and N is mea-
sured in kg of available nitrogen per ha.
To further parameterize the model developed in Section 2, we used data
characterizing the most common current practice under which a pig manure
surplus is used as an organic fertilizer by arable farmers. We assume a rep-
resentative ﬁeld ofH=1 ha and subdivide its domain into a set of S=20 sub-
plots of equal area, h=1/20 ha. The average initial stock of nitrogen in the
root zone of each of the sub-plots is assumed to be 4.5 kg (= 90/20, see
Table I below). Then the values of ~Ni; i ¼ 1; . . . ; 20; were simulated via
random number generator, assuming that ~Ni is normally distributed over the
ﬁeld with variance of 0.81 square kg of nitrogen (implying a coeﬃcient of
variation of 0.20). The main parameter values and sources are reported in
Table I.
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4.1. RESULTS
The vast majority of Dutch farmers who use manure choose to apply it in the
fall (k=1). Hence, we choose the fall application as our benchmark. Utilizing
the parameter values in Table I and assuming a tax of t=0.25 e per kg of N
loss (about 50% of the price of chemical fertilizer), the eﬀects of per unit
costs of manure purchase, transportation, and application, w (e/kg manure)
on optimal fertilization decisions and their environmental consequences (via
nitrogen loss) are illustrated in Table II.
Currently, manure application by contract labor in the Netherlands costs
about 0.003 e/kg. The results in the ﬁrst row of Table II suggest that even if a
representative arable farmer is oﬀered manure free of charge at the gate of a
manure-producing farm, he will not use it. In other words, if transportation
and application costs are not subsidized, the farmer will prefer to apply
nitrogen via chemical fertilizers only. As long as actual costs of manure to the
arable farmer, w, exceed 327.5 · 10)6 Euros per kg, the optimal fertilization
strategy is to apply only chemical fertilizers. When w ranges between 209.95 ·
10)6 and 327.49 · 10)6 (e/kg), mixed application of manure and chemical
fertilizer is the preferred fertilization strategy (Table II). If w drops below
209.95 · 10)6 (e/kg), the optimal fertilization strategy is to apply manure
only.
Table I. Benchmark values for the numerical analysis
Parameter Explanation Value Source
~Ni Average Stock of nitrogen at
plot i (in kg N per plot)
4.5 Ten Berge et al. 1999, table 3.4
(potatoes on clay soil)
cvð~NiÞ Coeﬃcient of variation of ~Ni 0.20 Own approximation
h Nitrogen content pig manure
in kg N / kg manure
0.0072 PAV, 1999, table 7.1;
cvðhÞ Coeﬃcient of variation of h 0.35 PDLT, 2003, table C
b Eﬃciency coeﬃcient
Nfertiliser applied in spring
0.9 Own approximation
d1 Eﬃciency coeﬃcient
Nmanure applied in the fall
0.35 PAV, 1999, footnote 1,
table 7.2
d2 Eﬃciency coeﬃcient
Nmanure applied in spring
0.70 PAV, 1999, table 7.2
cvðdÞ Coeﬃcient of variation of d 0.30 Approximated from
Ten Berge et al.
1999, table 3.7
PQ Price of ware potatoes
(in e per kg DM)
0.64 Bos, 2002, appendix 7
PC Price of fertilizer
(in e per kg N)
0.51 Bos, 2002, appendix 7
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Obviously, the above ranges are highly sensitive to some of the other
parameter values, especially to the level of the environmental tax on nitrogen
loss t, and should be treated with caution. If, for example, t were to increase
from 0.25 to 0.5 (e/kg N), manure will be applied only if w becomes negative,
i.e. smaller than )772.5 · 10)6 (e/kg). Namely, the representative arable
farmer will use manure only if he gets paid for it, possibly by manure-
producing farmers who are obliged to discharge their manure surplus (see
below). More speciﬁcally, with t=0.5 (e/kg N), the mixed application of
manure and chemical fertilizer will be adopted when w 2 [)772.5 · 10)6,
)889.3 · 10)6]. If w drops below )889.3 · 10)6 (e/kg), the optimal fertil-
ization strategy is to apply manure only.
The total contribution of fertilization to the plant-available nitrogen,
d1 hAþ bC, is independent of w and equal to 233.65 kg/ha (column 5,
Table II). However, as expected, the lower w is, the higher the level of A is,
and the lower the level of C. The additive relationship between A and C in the
expected yield function (equation (7)), implies that the substitution between
A and C is large. Increasing w by 56% (from 209.95 · 10)6 to 327.49 · 10)6)
reduces the optimal A/C ratio from 92539 to a low of 1.5.
While the impact of w on the value of the objective function in (9) is very
low, its environmental-associated impact might be signiﬁcant. As illustrated
in the last column of Table II, the sensitivity of the level of non-used N, or
nitrogen loss, L1=0.10C+0.00468A, is signiﬁcant. Much of the increase in
L1 resulting from a decrease in w is attributed to the large changes in manure
application that are accompanied by much smaller changes in the value of C.
Although the marginal impact of C on L1 (¶L1/¶C=0.1) is 21 times larger
than the marginal impact of A (¶L1 /¶A=0.00468), the impact of the latter on
total non-used nitrogen is much higher than the impact of the former. For
example, with w=264.59 · 10)6 the ‘‘contributions’’ of A and C to total
nitrogen-loss are 232 kg and 12 kg, respectively. The above result has an
Table II. The role of manure cost, w (k=1)
w(e/kg) A (kg/ha) d1 hA  N(A)
(kg N/ha)
C
(kg N/ha)
N(A)+b C
(kg N/ha)
Non-used
nitrogen =
L1 (kg N/ha)
300 · 10)5 0 0 260 234 25
327 · 10)6 397 1 258 234 28
303 · 10)6 19841 50 204 234 113
277 · 10)6 39683 100 148 234 201
265 · 10)6 49603 125 121 234 244
252 · 10)6 59524 150 93 234 288
227 · 10)6 79365 200 37 234 357
210 · 10)6 92359 233 1 234 432
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important implication on policy. As mentioned, manure-producing (poultry
and pig) farms are required to discharge their surplus via land application. It
may well be that it is more price eﬃcient for at least some of them, who face
high treatment cost for their manure, to pay arable farmers in order to
discharge the excess manure. This would result in greater substitution, but
can still be socially optimal. Policy makers should be aware of the fact that
the substitution of chemical fertilizer by manure may yield signiﬁcant envi-
ronmental costs, but it can still be a socially desired action.
As shown above, this substitution is quite sensitive to the level of envi-
ronmental tax, t, imposed by the government. Ceteris paribus, an increase in
the tax rate implies a signiﬁcant reduction in the amount of applied manure.
Thus, the positive environmental contribution associated with that increase is
oﬀset by the potential loss to manure-producing farmers who are obliged to
get rid oﬀ their excess manure via land application (or otherwise to reduce
the level of their livestock).
Recall that spring application of manure inﬂicts damage to the top soil,
resulting in reduction of crop yield, but much lower nitrogen loss
(ð1 d2Þ ¼ 0:30) relative to fall application (ð1 d1Þ ¼ 0:65). Thus, the
higher the tax rate levied on nitrogen loss, the higher the relative advantage
of spring application.
In the absence of accurate data on yield reduction caused by spring
application (given by /k=2 (<1) in our theoretical analysis), we compared
the proﬁtability of fall and spring applications by calculating ‘‘proﬁt
equivalent’’ levels of /k=2, denoted by /^2, for the various levels of w. Spe-
ciﬁcally, for each value of w we calculated the level of /^2 under which
expected proﬁts associated with the optimal fertilization strategy, when
manure is applied in the spring, is equal to the optimal expected proﬁts
associated with fall application. With t=0.25, all levels of /^2 were higher
than 0.9935, implying yield reductions which are lower than 0.65%. Namely,
if actual yield reduction associated with spring application of manure exceeds
0.65%, then fall application of manure is preferred to spring application.
A corollary of this is that if the actual yield reduction falls short of 0.65%,
fall application of manure is not attractive. Given the type of soil and normal
weather conditions in the Netherlands, in combination with current appli-
cation technologies, the actual yield loss commonly exceeds 0.65%, which
explains why most Dutch arable farmers who apply manure prefer the fall
application.
4.2. THE ROLE OF ENVIRONMENTAL TAX, t
To examine the sensitivity of the optimal fertilization strategy to changes in t,
we chose as a benchmark the results associated with fall application of
manure (k=1), with w=264.59 · 10)6, (see Table II). Then, we solved the
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optimization problem in (9) for t values ranging between 0 and 2. The results
are summarized in Table III. The optimal level of applied manure is quite
sensitive to the tax rate. For low tax values (0.2376 > t ‡ 0) the preferred
strategy is to apply manure only (C=0). When t increases from 0 to 0.2376,
the levels of A, N(A), and non-used nitrogen reduces by about 9.3%. Mixed
application of manure and chemical fertilizer is optimal only for a small
range of t values (0.2643 ‡ t ‡ 0.2376). Within this range, the substitution
between A and C is extreme: increasing the tax rate by 11% causes A to
decline from a high of about 92.4 tons per hectare to almost zero (0.4 tons/
ha), accompanied by a sharp increase in the value of C from 1 to 258 (kg N/
ha). The environmental impact of this substitution is quite large; the level of
non-used nitrogen is reduced from 432.48 to only 27.71 (kg N/ha) when t
increases from 0.2376 to 0.2643.
When t exceeds 0.2643, the optimal fertilization strategy is to apply only
chemical fertilizer (i.e., A=0), and a signiﬁcant increase in t causes only a
small decline in both C and the value of non-used nitrogen. In conclusion, the
results in Table III suggest that the impact of the environmental tax on the
level of non-used nitrogen is moderate for low values of t (under which A> 0
and C=0), extreme for a small range of higher t values (under which A > 0
and C > 0), and almost negligible for high t values (under which A=0 and
C > 0).
We also examined the sensitivity of the ‘‘proﬁt equivalent’’ threshold /^2 to
the tax level. Speciﬁcally, for each value of t presented in Table III, we
calculated the level of /^2 under which expected proﬁts associated with the
optimal fertilization strategy – when manure is applied in the spring – equals
the optimal expected proﬁts associated with fall application. The farmer is
indiﬀerent between applying manure in spring or fall, when the yield loss is
Table III. The impact of environmental tax, t (with k=1 and w = 264.59 · 10)6)
t(/kg N) A(kg/ha) d1 hA  N(A)
(kg N/ha)
C
(kg N/ha)
N(A)+b C
(kg N/ha)
Non-used
nitrogen =
L1 (kg N/ha)
0.0 101880 257 0 257 477
0.05 99962 252 0 252 468
0.15 96112 242 0 242 450
0.238 92388 233 1 234 432
0.25(basic) 49603 125 121 234 244
0.264 397 1 258 234 28
0.30 0 0 259 234 26
0.50 0 0 258 232 26
1.00 0 0 255 229 25
2.00 0 0 248 223 25
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equal to (1 /^2), hereafter: ‘‘acceptable yield loss’’. In Figure 2, (1 /^2) is
plotted as a function of t.
At t=0 (and w=264.59 · 10)6), the farmer applies manure only in the fall
application. Since nitrogen loss associated with spring application is signiﬁ-
cantly smaller than that associated with fall application, only a small yield
loss is acceptable to make the farmer indiﬀerent. When the tax increases, less
manure will be applied in the fall application. Hence, it is more attractive to
switch to spring application where mineral losses (and tax payments) are
lower, implying a larger acceptable yield loss. When the tax level rises to such
an extent that manure applied in the fall is substituted by fertilizer in spring,
switching to spring application becomes even more attractive and the
acceptable yield loss reaches its highest point. Further increases in tax cause
the manure application in the fall (but not in the spring) to vanish. At these
higher tax rates, the application of manure in spring also becomes less
attractive. Hence, the acceptable yield loss to make the farmer indiﬀerent
between fall and spring application becomes smaller. At very high tax levels,
spring application also vanishes (i.e., completely substituted by chemical
fertilizer) and manure is no longer relevant. Hence, the acceptable yield loss is
reduced to 0.
4.3. SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS FOR THE FALL APPLICATION
To examine the sensitivity of the results to product price (PQ), and the
variances of hðVðhÞÞ and d1ðVðd1ÞÞ, we choose as a benchmark the results of
fall application with w =264.59 · 10)6 (see Table II). We start with the
product price. Recall from equations (11) and (15) that manure application
decreases in PQ when the mixed application strategy is optimal (i.e., A > 0,
C > 0), and decreases in PQ when application of manure only is optimal
(A > 0, C=0). Chemical fertilizer increases in product prices under both the
Figure 2. Acceptable yield loss resulting from spring application manure at diﬀerent tax
rates.
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mixed application strategy and the strategy to apply only chemical fertilizers.
We changed PQ within the range of 0–3 e per kg DM. With w =
264.59 · 10)6 e/kg, the optimal strategy was to apply manure only for
product prices smaller than 0.38 e per kg DM and to adopt the mixed
application strategy for the rest of the assumed range of product prices. The
results are summarized in Figure 3.
Inspection of Figure 3 illustrates the inferiority of A relative to C under
the mixed application. As PQ increases, less of A and more of C is used while
the total amount of applied nitrogen increases. This is due to the fact that the
use of manure involves a penalty, which is attributed to the relatively high
nitrogen loss ð1 d1 ¼ 0:65 > 1 b ¼ 0:1Þ and to the variances
VðhÞ andVðdÞ. The higher the output price, the higher the penalty.
The sensitivity of the results of the benchmark case to mean preserving
spreads in the distribution of d and h, expressed by the coeﬃcients of vari-
ation (CV), is illustrated in Figures 4 and 5, respectively.
We changed CV(d) within the range of 0–0.7. With w=264.59 · 10)6, the
mixed application strategy was optimal for the whole range. As CV(d)
increases, the higher the disadvantage of manure relative to commercial
fertilizer becomes, implying that less of A and more of C is used, while the
total amount of applied nitrogen, N(A)+b C, is held ﬁxed at a level of
233.65 kg N/ha. The substitution of A by C yields a signiﬁcant reduction in
the level of non-used nitrogen (from 404.6 (kg N/ha) when CV(d) =0 to only
101.7 (kg N/ha) when CV(d) = 0.7). Increasing the uniformity of manure
application and improving cultivation practices may reduce the value of
CV(d) and, consequently, increase the level of applied manure. This suggests
that subsidizing of advanced cultivation and/or application technologies will
Figure 3. Manure (A) and fertilizer (C) as function of output price PQ.
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result in higher environmental damage caused by higher levels of non-used
nitrogen. Similar results were obtained with respect to the variance of h
(Figure 5).
With w=264.59 · 10)6 e/kg, the optimal fertilization strategy is to apply
only manure as long as CV(h) is lower than a threshold level of about 0.155.
As CV(h) exceeds this threshold level, the mixed application strategy becomes
optimal, and manure is gradually substituted by chemical fertilizer. Due to
this substitution, the higher CV(h), the lower the level of non-used nitrogen.
In other words, ceteris paribus – the more homogeneous the manure content
is, the lower is its relative disadvantage, and the higher the level of manure
application, implying a higher level of non-used nitrogen.
5. Summary and Conclusions
This paper has focused on farm-level nitrogen fertilization strategies
of Dutch arable farmers for analyzing the substitution between organic
Figure 5. Manure (A) and fertilizer (C) as function of CV(h).
Figure 4. Manure (A) and fertilizer (C) as function of CV(d).
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fertilizers (i.e. manure) and chemical fertilizers. The model developed cap-
tures and analyzes the major parameters aﬀecting the inferiority of manure
compared with chemical fertilizer, including the low availability and non-
uniformity of the nitrogen in manure, the low level and high non-uniformity
of plant-available nitrogen supplied via manure, and the potential damage to
top soil associated with spring application. The sensitivity of the optimal
fertilization decisions and their associated environmental impacts on product
price, manure cost, and environmental tax was also examined. The theoret-
ical analysis was applied to a representative Dutch grower of ware potatoes
in the northern part of the Netherlands.
The core of the problem is that manure-producing farms in the Nether-
lands are compelled to discharge their manure surplus, based on mineral
application norms, by contracting arable farmers who are willing to use the
manure as fertilizer. Arable farmers, however, are subject to nitrogen regu-
lation as a result of the EU Nitrates Directive (environmental tax on nitrogen
loss in this study) and, for a variety of reasons, are reluctant to use manure as
a substitute for chemical fertilizer. The inferiority of manure compared to
chemical fertilizer can be attributed to the relatively high nitrogen loss, and to
the high non-uniformity of nitrogen content in manure, as well as of manure
nitrogen available for crop uptake.
The empirical analysis has demonstrated that even if a representative
arable farmer is oﬀered manure free of charge at the gate of a manure-
producing farm, she will not do it. The reason being, that if transportation
and application costs are not subsidized, by manure-producing farms for
example, the farmer will prefer to apply nitrogen only via chemical fertilizers.
We also found that the optimal fertilization strategy is quite sensitive to the
cost of manure, (w), and to the environmental tax levied on non-used
nitrogen, (t).
The mixed application of manure and chemical fertilizer is the preferred
fertilization strategy under relatively narrow ranges of w and t. Within these
ranges, the substitution between the two fertilizers is considerable. Policy
makers should be aware of the fact that the substitution of chemical fertilizer
by manure may yield signiﬁcant environmental costs. Ceteris paribus, an
increase in the tax rate or in the cost of manure implies a signiﬁcant reduction
in the amount of applied manure. Thus, the positive environmental contri-
bution associated with that increase is oﬀset by the potential loss to manure-
producing farmers, who are obliged to get rid oﬀ their excess manure via land
application (or otherwise to reduce the level of their livestock).
The comparison of fall and spring applications of manure shows that the
former is preferred as long as actual yield reduction associated with spring
application exceeds 0.65%. Given the type of soil and normal weather con-
ditions in the Netherlands, in combination with current application tech-
nologies, the actual yield loss commonly exceeds 0.65%, which explains why
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the vast majority of Dutch arable farmers prefer the fall application. We also
found that the higher the non-uniformity of the nitrogen content in manure
and/or of manure-nitrogen available for crop uptake, the higher the disad-
vantage of manure relative to commercial fertilizer, implying a lower level of
non-used nitrogen.
The study presented here represents only a ﬁrst step in a comprehensive
analysis of the market for manure and of alternative agri-environmental
policies aimed at regulating nitrogen use. Clearly, expanding the analyzed
economic unit from a single arable farmer to a multi-farm framework, and
modeling the decision-making process of manure-producing farms would be
a signiﬁcant improvement. It will make it possible to investigate the market
for excess manure and the impact of alternative regulation policies on the
price at which it will be traded. Assuming an institutional setting under which
the allocation of costs and beneﬁts between manure producers and con-
sumers is determined through bargaining via game-theoretic setup is another
area that deserves further analysis. The analysis presented here could be used
as a building block in such analyses. Beyond that, the analysis can be
extended by taking explicit account of the side eﬀects associated with manure
application; like the contribution to organic matter in the soil, the phosphate
and potassium content of manure, the weeds included in manure, and its
unpleasant odor.
Notes
1. Stricter environmental regulations will work in two ways. Firstly, manure-producing
farmers will need to conform to stricter standards with respect to mineral losses, which will
increase their surpluses. Secondly, arable farmers who also have to meet stricter standards,
will be less likely to accept manure that is subject to leaching.
2. Potential relevant positive side eﬀects are the increased phosphate and potassium content
and the contribution to organic matter in the soil. Negative side eﬀects are, for example,
that manure may contain weeds, and that it has an unpleasant odor.
3. The selected number of sub-plots should be large enough so that the distribution of the
initial nitrogen stock over the (small) area of each sub-plot, h=H/S, is approximately
uniform.
4. The analysis here assumes average or ‘‘normal’’ weather conditions under which the soil is
not too wet and application of manure in spring is technically feasible. In cases where the
probability that application in spring is technically prohibitive is signiﬁcant, it may well be
that the producer would like to apply manure in both the fall and spring, reﬂecting the
trade-oﬀ between guaranteed application in the fall to uncertain application in spring. The
issue of split nitrogen application and stochastic weather is investigated in Feinerman et al.
(1990) and it is beyond the scope of this paper.
5. Our theoretical analysis is applied to ware potatoes grown in the northern part of the
Netherlands. Given the weather conditions in this region, the assumption that all nitrogen
not used by the crop is leached below the root zone is reasonable. Alternatively, we could
assume in the theoretical analysis that only part of the unused nitrogen is leached below
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the root zone (and contaminates water resources) whereas the remainder is carried over to
the beginning of the next growing period, aﬀecting the initial stock of ~Ni in that period.
However, this (more general) assumption will only aﬀect the values of the parameters di
k
and b, and has no impact on the qualitative results of our analysis.
6. Obviously, in reality the producer uses other inputs as well; however she is assumed to use
‘‘best management practices’’ for non-nitrogen inputs, like labor, machinery, herbicides
and other fertilizers. That is, these other inputs are assumed to be ﬁxed, and we focus only
on the application decisions of nitrogen.
7. In the original equilibrium for both chemical fertilizer (10b)’ and manure (10a)’, the
marginal cost of an additional unit of applied input is equal to its marginal beneﬁt. Since
manure is a rather inferior substitute for fertilizer, it will be used only where w is low
enough to compensate for the penalty that is related to the use of manure.
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